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Legality of State Corporate Farming Restrictions
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 1/16/04
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame 600-650 lb,
   Nebraska Auction Wght. Avg . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt . . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, hd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vacuum Packed Pork Loins, Wholesale,  
   13-19 lb, 1/4" Trim, Cent. US, cwt . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$79.14
85.06
87.71
122.17
35.00
*
92.36
*
164.72
$   *
102.15
     *
*
*
*
*
*
*
$79.03
98.72
106.54
126.77
40.00
      *
110.35
      *
181.44
Crops,
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.68
2.24
5.46
4.46
2.33
*
*
*
*
*
3.96
2.55
8.18
4.78
1.79
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . .
150.00
80.00
115.00
*
*
*
130.00
55.00
      *
* No market.
On August 19, 2003 the Eighth Circuit U.S. Court
of Appeals ruled that South Dakota’s constitutional
“Amendment E” restricting corporate farming, vio-
lated the interstate commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution. SD Farm Bureau v Hazeltine, 340 F3d
583 (8CA 2003). Because much of Amendment E’s
language is identical with Nebraska’s corporate
farming constitutional amendment (Initiative 300), the
decision implies that I300 could also be unconstitu-
tional. 
Adopted in 1998, Amendment E was challenged
by South Dakota feedlots who fed livestock owned by
out-of-state entities whose livestock ownership would
violate Amendment E. These plaintiffs contended that
Amendment E violated the interstate commerce clause
because it prevented out-of-state entities from owning
livestock in South Dakota. In its opinion, the Court of
Appeals noted statements by Amendment E supporters
that the amendment would prevent Murphy Farms and
Tyson Foods, both out-of-state corporations, from
operating swine production facilities in South Dakota.
The court interpreted these statements as reflecting a
discriminatory bias against out-of-state corporations.
The court ruled that this discriminatory intent in and of
itself violated the interstate commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution, rendering Amendment E unconstitu-
tional. 
Surprisingly the Court of Appeals did not analyze
the actual language of Amendment E itself. If it had,
the court would have realized that Amendment E
treated South Dakota non-family farm corporations
identically with non-South Dakota non-family farm
corporations, and that no economic discrimination
existed against out-of-state corporations (the same is
true for I300). The court, on October 31, 2003 declined
to rehear the case, meaning that Hazeltine will stand
unless it is reversed on appeal by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 
The fundamental issue is whether South Dakota (or
any state) can regulate non-family farm entities in
favor of family-farm entities. This issue was not
addressed in Hazeltine. Interestingly, one of the three
Hazeltine judges was a member of the Eighth Circuit
Judicial Panel that ruled in 1991 that I300 was consti-
tutional. MSM Farms v Spire, 927 F21d 330 (8CA
1991). In Spire, interstate commerce was not at issue
and was not addressed by the court. The Spire court
did conclude, however, that having different legal
rules for family-farm entities and non-family farm
entities did not violate either the due process clause or
the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Hazeltine court acknowledged that promoting
family farms was a legitimate state interest (340 F3d
at 598), but concluded that this could not overcome
Amendment E’s discriminatory intent against out-of-
state entities. However, the Hazeltine court was in-
correct in concluding that Amendment E discriminated
against out-of-state entities. 
If Hazeltine is not overruled, I300 will be vulnera-
ble to legal challenge. Out-of-state entities (such as
out-of-state meat packers) could argue that I300
discriminates against them by not allowing them to
own livestock and have it custom-fed in Nebraska, the
same allegation successfully used in Hazeltine. This
would give the Eighth Circuit an opportunity to correct
its Hazeltine mistake – out-of-state packers are subject
to the same livestock ownership restrictions as in-state
packers, so there is no discrimination. If I300 were
legally challenged and the Eighth Circuit adhered to
Hazeltine, I300 might still avoid being declared un-
constitutional. In the 1981 debate over I300, the
Murphy Farms and Tyson Foods of the world had not
yet risen to national prominence as livestock produc-
ers, and were not “targets” of I300 supporters. While
there was some interstate dimension to the I300 debate
(much was made of the Wall Street promotion and
funding of center-pivot limited partnerships in the
Nebraska Sandhills) the main issue was the role of
absentee owners (wherever located), and not specifi-
cally whether out-of-state interests threatened Ne-
braska family farmers. In any event, the outcome of a
Hazeltine challenge to I300 is uncertain. 
Hazeltine is one factor in a legislative proposal to
study the effects of I300 on Nebraska. LB1086 would
establish a Nebraska Agricultural Opportunities Task
Force to consider whether I300 should be modified in
response to changes occurring in the Nebraska agri-
cultural economy over the past two decades. The task
force would examine the effect of I300 on: (1) inter-
generational transfers between unrelated farmers, (2)
producer networking (e.g. farrowing cooperatives) and
value-added entities, (3) attracting investment in using
ag products for pharmaceutical and industrial pur-
poses, and (4) using new legal entities (such as limited
liability companies) in agriculture. The task force
would also consider the impact of Hazeltine on I300
and state corporate farming policy in general. 
This I300 reconsideration is appropriate. While
there may be legal work-arounds, I300 does limit ag
producer options. A good example is farrowing
cooperatives. Before I300, grain farmers often created
farrowing cooperatives to supply feeder pigs to co-op
members. When the baby pigs were fed and marketed,
co-op members added significant value to their grain.
A legal entity approximating the traditional farrowing
co-op can be developed within I300 constraints, but
the “co-op” members would have less control over the
farrowing operation, would have more risk, and would
face more paperwork. Loosening some I300 restric-
tions would give producers more options and greater
flexibility with which to face an increasingly uncertain
economic future. 
LB1086 will be heard by the Agriculture
Committee on February 17, 2004 at 1:30 p.m. in
Room 1054, State Capitol.
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